A Saudi-sponsored deal is expected to be signed months ago to resolve the insurgency led by the UAE military and air force to Aden, Yemen`s interim capital, and parts of Abyan province. But this failure to register treaties under the UN Charter could be a dead letter. Scientists have observed that respect has always been “lacking” and the lack of registration of an international agreement has not prevented the ICJ from imposing one in the case of Qatar`s maritime delimitation and island sovereignty against Bahrain. Neither Qatar nor the Quartet raised the issue in their pleadings before the ICJ; Saudi Arabia may have registered the treaties out of a plethora of caution rather than a sense of necessity. Therefore, not only are secret treaties such as the Riyadh agreements not contrary to international law in practice, but could even be appropriate for internal and external security reasons. 3. The Prime Minister of the current Government will begin his work in Aden, the interim capital, within 7 days of the signing of this Agreement, in order to activate all state institutions of the various provinces liberated to serve Yemeni citizens and to work on the payment of salaries and financial benefits to personnel of all military sectors. State security and civil affairs are located in the provisional capital, Aden, and in all liberated governorates. The first two Riyadh agreements are full of references to the stability and security of the GCC member states, the signatories. It was only in the third agreement that Egypt, a non-GCC member, was first mentioned, although the Quartet claimed that references to the Muslim Brotherhood in previous agreements focused on the situation in Egypt. However, Egypt was not a signatory to any of the three agreements, nor is Egypt a GCC member state.
The requesting Party undertakes to keep such persons in detention and, subject to Article 22 of this Agreement, to return them as soon as possible or within the period prescribed by the Contracting Party receiving such requests. The Quartet answered this question in the affirmative in its ICJ briefs when it stated: “[The measures] were also aimed at [Qatar] complying with Egypt`s obligations as a third party beneficiary under the Riyadh Agreements (see Memorial, Vol. I at page 59, no. 154). Qatar does not appear to have challenged the proposal – but was it right to do so? The only explicit reference to Egypt in the Riyadh agreements could be evidence of the intention to grant substantial contractual rights to Egypt. The text of the third Riyadh agreement states that the parties are “committed to the Gulf Cooperation Council`s discourse to support the Arab Republic of Egypt and contribute to its security, stability and financial support… In addition, the parties pledged to “cease all media activity” against Egypt and to “work to put an end to all crimes in the Egyptian media.” On the other hand, the second Riyadh agreement, the mechanism, provides that “if one GCC country does not comply with this mechanism, the other GCC countries have the right to take all appropriate measures to protect their security and stability.” (Highlighted only here.) There are other examples of the rights exercised by, vis-à-vis and between GCC member states. .